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A PREFERRED APPROACH: HOW MINORITYOWNED BUSINESSES CAN COMBAT UNION
DISCRIMINATION
EDWARD FRISCHLING
I. INTRODUCTION
Minority-owned businesses have historically been unsuccessful in
obtaining relief against labor unions allegedly engaged in discriminatory
treatment based on the minority status of the business owner. For example,
in Trustees of the Painters Union Deposit Fund v. Interior/Exterior
Specialist Company,1 an Hispanic-owned company sued a labor union
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act for allegedly ordering
audits of the company’s books and records while not doing the same for
similarly-situated, “white–owned” companies. In that case, the company
was a painting contractor, solely owned by a Hispanic man. After five
years of operation, the company’s employees complained to the union that
they were not receiving certain fringe benefit contributions from the
company.2 Subsequently, the union requested a comprehensive audit of the
company. In response, the company filed a claim alleging that the union’s
ordering of comprehensive audits constituted discrimination under Section
1981 because the Union had not ordered audits of non-Hispanic-owned
companies with similar business practices.3 Among other evidence, the
Hispanic owner obtained the testimony of various individuals, including
the owner of another painting company who testified that, after he began to
hire numerous Hispanic workers, he received a barrage of prevailing wage
complaints from the Union.4 On these facts, the Sixth Circuit considered
whether the Union applied its contractual right under the applicable
collective bargaining agreement to issue comprehensive audits in a
discriminatory manner. This article will examine the viability of the causes
of action available to plaintiff minority-owned businesses who believe
labor unions have discriminated against them, like the plaintiff in Painters
Union.
Minority-owned businesses that believe labor unions have
discriminated against them have two viable causes of action. The first (and


Columbia University Law School, J.D. 2011. Labor & Employment Associate in
the New York office of Holland & Knight LLP. I would like to thank Professor Rodger
Citron and Robert Valletti for their tremendous insights on the substance of this article.
I would also thank Sandra and Allison Frischling for their support during the writing
process.
1
371 Fed. Appx. 654 (6th Cir. 2010).
2
Id. at 656.
3
See id. at 657.
4
See id. at 658 (testifying that the Union had seldom contacted him during the first
ten years of his business).
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more likely to succeed) cause of action is bringing a claim against a union
for discriminatory application of contractual provisions in the applicable
collective bargaining agreement. The second cause of action available to
minority-owned businesses is filing a claim against a union under the
theory that the union’s discriminatory conduct interferes with the
business’s ability to obtain and maintain commercial contracts. This is also
known as “discriminatory interference with third-party contracts.” This
article not only provides a short background of the history of 42 U.S.C. §
1981, but it will also describe the recent case law under both causes of
action available to minority-owned businesses.
The article concludes with an analysis of the viability of both theories,
which shows that a minority-owned business is more likely to succeed on a
claim that the contractual provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
are being applied in a discriminatory manner than on a claim that a labor
union’s conduct is discriminatorily interfering with the minority owned
businesses contracts. Both causes of action, however, may be viable to
provide relief to minority-owned businesses that are aggrieved by the
discriminatory conduct of labor unions.
II. BACKGROUND: SECTION 1981
A. Provisions of Section 1981
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides as follows:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce
contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment
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under color of State law.5
Generally, to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant
intended to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3)
the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination concerning one or more of the
activities enumerated in Section 1981.6 One of the activities protected by
Section 1981 is contracting. The statute prohibits intentional race
discrimination affecting “the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms
and conditions of the contractual relationship.”7
Litigation involving 42 U.S.C. § 1981 most commonly involves the
right to make and to enforce employment contracts.8 In non-employment
litigation, under Section 1981, claims have been pursued predominantly for
conduct that prevented the formation of the contract, as opposed to conduct
that affected the nature and quality of the contractual relationship.9 At issue
in many of the cases examined in this section are the types of conduct that
affect minority-owned business’ enjoyment of the benefits, privileges,
terms, conditions, nature, and quality of the contractual relationship.
Specifically, the article will analyze this possible cause of action as it
applies to labor unions enforcing the terms of their collective bargaining
agreements in a discriminatory manner.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 also offers relief when racial discrimination blocks
the creation of contractual relationships.10 A plaintiff asserting a claim
under Section 1981 must, initially, identify an impaired contractual
relationship under which the plaintiff has rights.11 Such a contractual
relationship need not already exist because Section 1981 protects the
would-be contracting party along with those who have already made
contracts.12 Defendants are liable under Section 1981 when, for racially
motivated reasons, they prevent individuals who “[seek] to enter into
contractual relationships” from doing so.13 42 U.S.C. § 1981 not only
5

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
See, e.g., Lauture v. Int'l Bus. Machines, 216 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2000) (raising
the issue of whether an at-will employee could sue for racially-discriminatory
discharge under Section 1981).
7
42 U.S.C. §1981(b).
8
See, e.g., Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1998)).
9
See id.; see also Bobbitt v. Rage Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. North Cal. 1998)
(claiming the poor service they received at a franchised pizza restaurant was motivated
by racially discriminatory animus).
10
See, e.g., Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006)
(determining whether a plaintiff who lacks any rights under an existing contractual
relationship may bring suit under Section 1981).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
6
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protects against the actions of contracting parties but also protects against
the actions of third parties.14 Tortious interference with third-party contract
rights violates Section 1981 when the interference is racially motivated.15
This cause of action has been recognized in the Second, Fourth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits.16 These courts have all held that defendants are liable
under Section 1981 for interference with third-party contracts only when
the defendant actually has the power or authority to prevent plaintiffs from
contracting with a third party.17 In these circumstances, courts require a
demonstration “that the defendant both possessed: (1) sufficient authority
to significantly interfere with the individual's ability to obtain contracts
with third parties and (2) that the party actually exercised that authority to
the individuals’ detriment.”18 Additionally, a party must allege and identify
particular and specific business opportunities that were lost due to
discriminatory interference by a third-party before a claim for third-party
interference can be stated.19 The cases examined in this article, under this
cause of action, will viewed through the lens of discriminatory conduct of
labor unions.
B. History and Intent of Section 1981
During the Reconstruction Era, and pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
provided the guarantees now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.20 Congress
intended for the Civil Rights Act to counter discrimination faced by the
recently freed slaves.21 After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
14

See Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance, 720 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (citing
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2001)).
15
See, e.g., Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir 2008).
16
See supra footnotes 18, 19, 43, 134, 150 and accompanying text.
17
Ginx,720 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
18
Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).
19
See Ginx, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 357; see also Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d
1262, 1267 – 68 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that vague and conclusory allegations of lost
business opportunities are insufficient to state a claim under §1981); Morris v. Office
Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a claim under Section 1981 had to
allege an actual loss of contract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract
opportunities).
20
Note that the original language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not contain the
phrase “all persons” but rather “citizens, of every race and color.”
21
See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (“Congress
instead acted to protect the freedmen from intentional discrimination by those whose
object was to make their former slaves dependent serfs, victims of unjust laws, and
debarred from all progress and elevation by organized social prejudices.”) (internal
citations omitted); Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d
827, 835 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Congress reenacted the text of the 1866 Act in the Enforcement Act of
1870.22
After Congress passed the Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C § 1981
“underwent nearly a century of desuetude during which debate regarding
its scope and meaning was generally subsumed by the controversy
surrounding the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.”23 The statute did not gain traction as a tool in remedial litigation
because there was “lingering uncertainty regarding the scope of the statute
and the extent of Congress's authority to prohibit discrimination divorced
from state action.”24 Subsequently, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the
statute from its prior existence “as a device to augment the remedies for
previously recognized forms of discrimination, to a litigation tool in its
own right with unparalleled theoretical coverage.”25
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court interpreted a
companion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to encompass and to prohibit racial
discrimination in purely private transactions.26 The Jones Court held that
the right to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property” is secured against interference from both governmental
and private actions.27
In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court explicitly came to the same result
under Section 1981. The issue in Runyon was whether Section 1981
prevents “private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from
denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes.”28
The plaintiffs, parents of African American children, had sought to enter
into contractual relationships with the schools. “Under those contractual
relationships, the schools would have received payments for services
rendered, and the prospective students would have received instruction in
return for those payments.”29 The Court held that the schools' refusal to
admit them “amount[ed] to a classic violation of § 1981.”30 The Court
emphasized that Congress had the right to reach private acts of
discrimination in the private school setting because of its power under the
Thirteenth Amendment to enact legislation to combat racial
22

Kamehameha Sch.., 470 F.3d at 835.
Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th
Cir. 2005), rev'd in part on reconsideration, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006).
24
Id. (declaring that “governmental action” was required in a suit based on the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
25
Id.; see Runyon v. McCreary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer,
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 423 (1968).
26
Jones, 392 U.S. at 423-24.
27
Id. (“[W]hen Congress provided in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act that the right to
purchase and lease property was to be enjoyed equally throughout the United States by
Negro and white citizens alike, it plainly meant to secure that right against interference
from any source whatever, whether governmental or private.”).
28
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160.
29
Id. at 172.
30
Id.
23

348

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:2

discrimination.31 Runyon, then, involved a straightforward case of
discrimination, not a remedial policy. Accordingly, Jones and Runyon
finally dispensed with the state action requirement and held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 reached purely private acts of discrimination by virtue
of Congress' power under section two of the Thirteenth Amendment.32
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,33 the Supreme Court indicated
that the analysis under Title VII should be the same as Section 1981 claims
brought against private employers.34 In Patterson, the plaintiff brought a
Section 1981 suit against her former employer alleging that the employer
harassed her, failed to promote her, and fired her on account of her race.35
The Court discussed the similarities and differences between Section 1981
and Title VII and held that the Title VII burden-shifting system of proof,
established in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine36 and
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,37 applied to the instant case.38 Under
the burden shifting system, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by coming forward with evidence that an employer
considered race in its employment decisions.39 After a prima facie case is
established, the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the decision.40 If a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason exists, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the justification provided was pretextual and that the plan is
invalid.41 Since Patterson, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has become a powerful
weapon in the fight to eradicate discrimination.
C. Application of Current Case Law in Suits Brought by
Minority-Owned Businesses
Both causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are applicable to a wide
range of union conduct. Examples of union conduct could include, but
would not be limited to, a union’s enforcement of wage policies,
distribution of letters of good standing, issuance of audits, and any other
contractual requirements under a collective bargaining agreement. In
31

Id. at 170-71.
Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2005), rev'd in part on reconsideration, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006).
33
491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds.
34
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
35
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 169 (1989).
36
450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).
37
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
38
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186.
39
Id.; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987).
40
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187.
41
Id.
32
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theory, both causes of action would intersect and be used in conjunction
with each other to remedy this type of discriminatory union behavior.
Although no case law currently exists (in the context a minority business
owner suing a union) in which the lawyers have argued under both
theories,42 one could imagine circumstances where both causes of action
could be used.
This article will use the following hypothetical as a vehicle for the
purposes of analysis. A union discriminatorily refuses to supply a letter of
good standing to a shipping company because its owner is African
American (assume the company needs a letter of good standing to be hired
by third parties). Under the first cause of action, the shipping company
would have relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, if it could prove that the union
refused to supply the letter because of racial animus. The owner of the
shipping company would have relief under the second cause of action if it
proved that that the union’s discriminatory refusal to supply the letter
interfered with its ability to make contracts with third parties. This
hypothetical will be explored further in Part IV of this article.
III. RECENT CASE LAW
A. Challenges to Contractual Provisions
At issue in the cases examined in this section of the article is conduct
that affects the enjoyment of the benefits, privileges, terms, conditions,
nature, and quality of the contractual relationship.
In Trustees of the Painters Union Deposit Fund v. Interior/Exterior
Specialist Company, the trustees of a union fund brought an action seeking
fringe benefits against a union-painting contractor and a non-union painting
contractor.43 The contractors impleaded the union, alleging discrimination
and defamation claims and sought restitution for overpayment of the fringe
benefits.44Interior/Exterior Specialist Company (“IES”) was a Hispanicowned, union painting contractor with Mr. Llamas as its sole shareholder,
officer, and director. The Llamas Group (“TLG”) was a non-union,
painting contractor founded in 1999 by Mr. Llamas’ wife as the sole
shareholder, officer, and director.45 In 1998, IES and Painters District
council No. 22 of the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied
Trades (“The Union”) concluded a collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) that required IES to pay a set fringe benefit amount to the Painters
Union Deposit Fund (“The Fund”) for every hour that IES painters worked.
42

In Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 45 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1991), an
individual member of the union sued under both theories.
43
Trustees of Painters Union Deposit Fund v. Interior/Exterior Specialist Co., 371 Fed.
Appx. 654 (6th Cir. 2010).
44
Id. at 654.
45
Id. at 656.

350

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:2

In 2003, IES employees complained that they were not receiving fringe
benefit contributions, and the Union requested a comprehensive audit of
IES.46 Additionally, in 2003, the Union filed a National Labor Relations
Board charge against IES and TLG. The Union alleged that for six months
IES and TLG had worked as an illegal, double-breasted operation and
failed to pay CBA required wages and fringe benefits.47 In February 2004,
the Fund sued IES for alleged collective bargaining violations and for
failure to pay fringe benefits. Additionally, they sought a court mandated,
comprehensive audit of IES’s books and records to determine the amount
owed.48 IES filed a counterclaim alleging that the Union’s ordering of
comprehensive audits constituted discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981
because the Union had not ordered audits of non-Hispanic owned
companies with similar business practices.49
Mr. Llamas supported his discrimination claim with the testimony of
various individuals, including other contractors. In support of Mr. Llamas
claims, Mr. Balatzis, an owner of a non-union painting company, testified
that the Union seldom contacted him during his first ten years in business.
After he hired Hispanic workers, however, contact from the union
increased, and he received a “barrage of prevailing wage complaints.”50
Additionally, Robert Kennedy, the union manager, testified that Mr.
Llamas had previously notified the Union that other union-painting
contractors had related non-union companies, which Mr. Llamas alleged
gave them a competitive advantage over IES. Furthermore, other unioncontractors testified that they owned related non-union companies, but the
Union had not ordered comprehensive audits of their companies.51 These
other contractors also testified that, to their knowledge, union employees
had not complained about their payment practices.52
The district court found that IES’s 42 U.S.C. §1981 claim was
insufficient because the Union would have ordered comprehensive audits
of IES, regardless of IES’ Hispanic ownership, due to employee complaints
about IES’s failure to pay fringe benefits.53 The district court also
concluded that the Union had not ordered comprehensive audits of other
firms because their employees did not complain about their wages and
46

Id.
A double-breasted operation is a condition where an employer operates two closely
related companies—one with a union contract and one without. Under such operation,
the employer will normally assign most of the work to the non-union segment of his
two companies.
48
Trustees of Painters Union Deposit Fund, 371 Fed. Appx. at 656.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 658.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
47
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noted that the Union does not aggressively enforce the CBA without
employee complaints. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the Union
did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when it ordered comprehensive audits of
IES but not of non-Hispanic union contractors with closely related nonunion companies. The court reasoned that the Union did not order
comprehensive audits of other entities allegedly engaged in double
breasting because it received no employee complaints about those
entities.54
In Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia v. KIA
Enterprises,55 the plaintiffs, Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund (“The
Union”), sued Kia Enterprises (“Kia”) to collect payments allegedly owed
to them under a collective bargaining agreement and related trust
agreements (collectively the “CBA”).56 Kia, an African-American owned
business, filed a counterclaim, alleging that in seeking to collect the
payments allegedly owed by Kia, the Union violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Kia claimed that the Union, in pursuing their claim under the CBA,
“acted in furtherance of and pursuant to their long-standing pattern and
practice of discriminating and retaliating against Minority Business
enterprises and minority members of the carpenters union; particularly
African American business and union members.”57 The counterclaim
alleged numerous, specific discriminatory actions by the Union. First, it
alleged that the Union submitted a formal demand for payment to Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company as the first step in submitting an
unsubstantiated claim against Kia's performance bond.58 Second, the
counterclaim alleged that the plaintiffs pressured the School Reform
Commission of the City of Philadelphia (“SRC”) to refuse to make timely
payments for money owed to Kia.59 Third, it alleged that the plaintiffs did
not similarly pressure the SRC with respect to non-minority-owned
businesses that owe the plaintiffs money.60 Fourth, the counterclaim alleged
that the plaintiffs discriminated against Kia by auditing Kia's books and
records, including those that had no relation to work covered by the CBA.61
Finally, Kia claimed that the plaintiffs made similar unjustified demands of
another minority-owned company but did not make similar demands of
non-minority-owned businesses.62
The court held that Kia failed to sufficiently plead specific facts to
54

Id.
Civ. No. 09-116, 2009 WL 2152276, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2009).
56
Kia Enterprises, Civ. No. 09-116, at *1.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at *2, *3 (finding Kia attempted “to ‘nidge’ its allegations of discrimination
across the ‘line from conceivable to plausible’ . . . . [H]owever, [it] offers no specific
facts in support . . . .”).
62
Id. at *1.
55
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support its counterclaim that the pension funds disparately treated minority
and non-minority businesses in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.63 The court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs began the process of making a claim
against Kia's performance bond, sought to persuade a city agency to
withhold payments to Kia, and demanded to audit Kia's books and records;
however, it noted that these actions were entirely consistent with a lawful
attempt by the plaintiffs to collect unpaid CBA obligations that they were
owed. Citing the Iqbal standard for pleadings, the court reasoned that Kia’s
allegations alone were not sufficient to suggest actionable wrongdoing. 64
Additionally, Kia's allegation that the plaintiffs took similar steps against
other minority-owned businesses was also entirely consistent with lawful
actions by the plaintiffs to collect unpaid CBA payments.65 The court
emphasized that Kia did not plead sufficient, additional facts to push its
allegations of discrimination across the “line from conceivable to
plausible.”66 Indeed, the court was not persuaded because Kia failed to
identify particular instances of disparate treatment. Thus, the court held that
the allegations were merely “legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations,” and in order to prevail, Kia would need to plead its allegations
with more specificity.67
B. Comparator Cases and Their Applicability to Employer-Union
Discrimination Cases
The logic employed in the above cases is similar to cases in the
employment context in which violations of legitimate employer
expectations are met with disparate treatment based on race.68 For example,
in Curry v. Menard, an African-American cashier violated the store's
progressive disciplinary policy.69 The policy provided that each cashier’s
register would be counted at the end of the day.70 The amount counted
would then be compared to a master computer printout.71 The first time a
cashier's register count deviated from the printout by three dollars or more,
the cashier would receive a written warning.72 If this happened two more
times, it would result in the termination of the cashier.73 The plaintiff in
63

Id.
Id. at *2.
65
Id.
66
Id. at *3.
67
Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 29 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)).
68
Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2001).
69
Id. at 475.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 476.
64
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Curry admitted that she violated the progressive disciplinary policy by
being overdrawn and should have been terminated.74 She maintained,
however, that two, non-African-American cashiers with similar violations
were not terminated.75 From January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998, the
plaintiff was the only cashier terminated for violating the store's
progressive discipline policy; but, if the employer strictly enforced its own
policy, sixteen other cashiers should have been terminated in that same
time period.76 The issue before the court was whether the employer applied
its legitimate employment expectations in a discriminatory manner. The
court held that there was sufficient evidence of discrimination for the
plaintiff to survive summary judgment.
Other analogous factual scenarios to unions discriminatorily applying
the terms of collective bargaining agreements involve franchisors applying
the terms of their standard franchise agreement in a discriminatory
manner.77 In Elkhatib v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., the Seventh Circuit applied
the McDonnell Douglas78 framework to a case in which a franchisor
applied a contractual provision of the franchise agreement in a racially
discriminatory manner.79 In Elkhatib, the plaintiff was an Arab franchisee
who refused to handle pork products (specifically the ham and bacon in
Dunkin Donuts' breakfast sandwiches) despite entering into a franchise
agreement that required all franchisors to carry Dunkin Donuts’ full
breakfast line.80 The plaintiff claimed that the handling of these products
was forbidden to members of the Arab race by tradition and custom.81 For
over twenty years, the plaintiff owned multiple franchises. During that
entire time, Dunkin Donuts did not require him to serve pork products.82 In
2002, the plaintiff wanted to relocate one of his stores and renew his
franchise agreement.83 Dunkin Donuts did not allow the plaintiff to relocate
his store or renew his franchise agreement, however, because of his failure
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
See supra Section III(C)(1) (analyzing further Curry v. Menard in the context of
unions).
78
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could make out a prima facie claim of racial
discrimination by showing “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.” Id.
79
493 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007).
80
Elkhatib, 493 F.3d at 828 (noting Dunkin Donuts introduced its breakfast sandwiches
in 1984, which included a choice of ham, cheese, bacon, and sausage, almost five years
after Elkhatib began his franchise).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
75
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to carry Dunkin Donuts' full breakfast sandwich product line.84 Based on
Dunkin Donuts' conduct, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 because Dunkin Donuts applied the franchise provision in a racially
discriminatory manner.85
The plaintiff established his case by showing that Dunkin Donuts
allowed similarly-situated franchisees to carry less than the full product
line without consequences.86 Dunkin Donuts explained that the reasons the
other franchisees did not carry the breakfast products were because of lease
issues, space issues, and customer preferences.87 They noted that one of
those franchises did not carry breakfast sandwiches because its lease
prohibited it from serving sandwiches; another did not carry any breakfast
sandwiches because it lacked space for the toaster oven; and the third did
not carry any pork products because it sought to meet the demand in the
area for a kosher establishment.88
The court emphasized that the franchises identified as comparators
were identical in all relevant respects in that they all failed to carry part or
all of the breakfast line of products despite the requirement in their
franchise agreement that they do so.89 Accordingly, the court did not accept
Dunkin Donuts’ explanation.90 It concluded that the franchise provision
was absolute in its terms and did not indicate that exceptions would be
made for any reason.91 The court held that there was no meaningful
distinction, for the purposes of the “similarly situated” inquiry, between
franchisees that refused to carry breakfast sandwiches because of lease and
space issues and the plaintiff.92 The court further articulated that the
similarly-situated requirement should not be applied mechanically or
inflexibly; rather, it is a flexible, common-sense inquiry that seeks to
determine whether there are enough common features between the
individuals to allow a meaningful comparison.93 The Seventh Circuit
cautioned against an overly technical or rigid interpretations of this
requirement when it stated:
It is important not to lose sight of the common-sense aspect
of this inquiry. It is not an unyielding, inflexible requirement
84
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that requires near one-to-one mapping between employeesdistinctions can always be found in particular job duties or
performance histories or the nature of the alleged transactions .
. . but the fundamental issue remains whether such distinctions
are so significant that they render the comparison effectively
useless. In other words, the inquiry simply asks whether there
are sufficient commonalities on the key variables between the
plaintiff and the would-be comparator to allow the type of
comparison that, taken together with the other prima facie
evidence, would allow a jury to reach an inference of
discrimination or retaliation-recall that the plaintiff need not
prove anything at this stage.94
Thus, the court held that Elkhatib's claim should survive summary
judgment because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
pretext.95
To guide other courts facing similar cases, the Elkhatib court held that
in these circumstances, the plaintiff (a minority business owner) can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by producing evidence that:
(1) he belonged to a protected class; (2) he met the franchisor's legitimate
expectations with regard to the franchise agreement; (3) he suffered an
adverse action; and 4) similarly-situated non-protected individuals were
treated more favorably.96 Once the plaintiff meets that burden, the
traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process would
commence.97
C. Discriminatory interference with Third-Party Contracts
This section of the article analyzes the issue of racial discrimination as
a blocking mechanism to the creation of contractual relationships.
Specifically, this section examines factual scenarios in which a defendant
discriminatorily interferes with a plaintiff’s ability to obtain contracts with
third parties.
1. Union Context
In Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597,98 the defendant
union, Local Union No. 597, operated a job referral service pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. Even though the job referral system was a
significant source of jobs for union members, the Local deprived Daniels,
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an African-American member of the Local, of referral opportunities.99 As a
result, he alleged that the union racially discriminated against its AfricanAmerican members in making referrals, violating of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
In district court, Daniels produced evidence showing not only that
Local 597 had a long history of discriminatory policies but also that the
referral system itself violated Section 1981. First, he showed that the agents
of Local 597 who were responsible for giving out work to union members
maintained a blacklist that included the names of many African-American
union members.100 To hide their actions, those agents gave out work
assignments to white union members through back door phone calls and
meetings.101 Second, Daniels introduced expert testimony demonstrating
that black members of Local 597 received fewer job referrals than they
should relative to their population.102 Third, a fellow African American
union member testified that the agents of the union once told him that a
contractor had no need for Local 597 workers, but when he and six fellow
members showed up to the construction site, they were immediately
hired.103 Fourth, Daniels testified that he witnessed the agents of the union
making discriminatory referrals in plain sight.104 While he stood around
waiting for an assignment, he heard union agents giving out referrals over
the telephone and observed favored (white) union members going into the
back room to receive referrals.105 Finally, he showed that Local 597
actively obstructed him from obtaining employment at a construction job
by refusing to submit a pro forma letter of recommendation.106 Because
Daniels did not have the letter, the employer required him to undergo
aptitude testing.107 Based on the defendants conduct, Daniels argued, inter
alia, that the defendant interfered with his right to contract with third
parties through improperly discriminating against him on the basis of his
race. The district court concluded that Local 597's job referral service was
the primary mechanism through which contractors hired union employees;
accordingly, the court held that “[i]n essence, no referral meant no job and
no opportunity for union members to enter into employment contracts with
employers.”108
The union appealed from a jury verdict in Daniels' favor, arguing that it
did not interfere with Daniels' right to make contracts because its “referral
99
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service was nothing more than a mechanism to encourage union members
to find employment.”109 Additionally, the union argued that “[o]bstructing
someone's right to contract with others is . . . unactionable under [Section]
1981.”110 The Seventh Circuit rejected both of these arguments and
reasoned that:
This kind of race-based impediment to contract formation
constitutes exactly the sort of racially discriminatory
interference with the right to contract that remains actionable
under § 1981. To hold otherwise would impose a sort of § 1981
privity of contract requirement that would effectively protect
third parties such as labor unions from § 1981 liability . . . .
Local 597 is not an unrelated third party whose interference
with the contract bears an attenuated or haphazard connection to
contracting between its members and the employer. On the
contrary, Local 597 is the necessary intermediary and conduit
connecting job opportunities to job referrals.111
Accordingly, the court held that the union violated Section 1981 when it
intentionally deprived Daniels of his ability to enter into contracts with
employers.112
2. Other Contexts
The following cases do not involve union conduct but could be used,
by analogy, to aid minority business owners who feel they have been
aggrieved by discriminatory union conduct.
In Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital,113 the plaintiff, Vakharia,
was an anesthesiologist who alleged that the defendant hospital violated 42
U.S.C. § 1981 when it interfered with her ability to contract with patients.
The hospital maintained a system where anesthesiologists were the sole
mechanism to obtain patients was through assignment by the hospital and
referrals by staff surgeons.114 During a two-year period, the hospital
reduced the quantity and quality of Vakharia’s caseload, removed her from
a “first call” schedule, baselessly classified her as a junior anesthesiologist
(which confined her to a limited number of relatively simple types of
procedures), and ultimately suspended her.115 She argued that these actions
interfered with her ability to make contracts with prospective patients and
109
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were taken because of her color, race, national origin, age, and sex in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1981 of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act.116 The court acknowledged that Section 1981
prohibits “discriminatory interference by a third party with the exercise of
the right to make contracts.”117 The court concluded that the alleged
interferences (e.g., limiting the number of patients) “all seem to fall easily
within the rubric of proscribed conduct” and allowed Vakharia's § 1981
claim to proceed past a motion to dismiss.118
In Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon,119 the defendant newspaper ran two
stories about Phelps, a local white attorney who often represented black
clients. The articles discussed Phelps’ tendency to bring lawsuits shortly
after alleged incidents and settling them for a fraction of the amount
sought. Critics of Phelps were quoted in the article as stating that he
brought “strike suits” for “nuisance value.”120 Subsequently, Phelps sued
the newspaper, alleging that the story (which Phelps viewed as hostile)
“interfered with his ‘prospective business opportunities’” in violation of
Section 1981.121 The district court dismissed the claim noting that the
plaintiff did not allege that he was deprived of an interest protected by
Section 1981.122 The Tenth Circuit affirmed and emphasized that the
plaintiff did not allege any specific losses, noting that the cases supporting
the plaintiff’s theory all involved the actual loss of employment or other
contract interests.123 The Tenth Circuit held that vague and conclusory
allegations are insufficient to state a deprivation of the right to make and
enforce contracts under Section 1981.124 It noted that the plaintiff had the
same right as others to enter into contracts with those who wish to contract
with him.125 Furthermore, the court articulated that even if the newspaper
defamed him and, thus, arguably made him less attractive to some who
otherwise might want to contract with him, the defamation does not deny
him the basic right to contract.126
In Morrison v. American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,127
Morrison, an African American female, sued the American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology (“The Board”) under Section 1981 alleging that
116
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the Board discriminated against her on racial grounds by denying her
certification in psychiatry. In its defense, the Board contended that it
constructed, administered, and evaluated the only examinations for board
certification in psychiatry in the United States. Accordingly, they
controlled a psychiatrist's eligibility for employment and staff privileges at
many hospitals and other health organizations.128
After failing both parts of the oral examination on her first try, in April
1993, Morrison passed the live patient portion of the exam, but failed the
video portion.129 Both of the examiners for that video portion were white
males. Another candidate for certification, a white female, made the same
differential and incorrect diagnosis in the video portion as Morrison. She
received board certification while Morrison did not.130
Morrison claimed that the Board discriminated against her on racebased grounds throughout her entire attempt to become board certified.
First, she claimed that because the Board required her to submit a
photograph prior to the examination (and thus see that she was an African
American female), they were able to assign her to a more difficult
examination facility, biased examiners, and more difficult patient
profiles.131 Second, she claimed that the Board failed her while passing a
similarly-situated white applicant (the psychiatrist who made the same
diagnosis).132 Finally, she claimed that the Board’s use of a subjective
evaluation system facilitated racial biases into the examination.133
Morrison alleged that certification “is a large, if not the primary factor
which patients consider and many hospitals require in choosing or hiring a
physician.”134 Accordingly, she claimed her denial of certification
discriminatorily interfered with her right to make contracts with
prospective clients under Section 1981.135 Specifically, she alleged that
because of the Board’s discriminatory conduct: 1) she would not be
considered for employment in large hospitals and HMO’s that require
psychiatrists to be board certified; 2) her current salary is lower than it
would have been if she was certified; and 3) her expertise will be called
into question from future employers and potential patients.136 The Board
argued that these allegations were insufficient because “Morrison ha[d] not
alleged that the Board ha[d] interfered with her efforts to make a specific
contract, as contrasted with assertions of ‘lost economic opportunities' that
are too speculative to be recognized under Section 1981” and because the
“Board [did] not have the kind of ‘active control’ over Morrison's ability to
128
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contract that is needed to call Section 1981 into play.”137
The court rejected these arguments and upheld Morrison's right to
proceed: “Morrison has alleged more than abstract or pie-in-the-sky lost
economic opportunities. She says expressly that without Board certification
she will suffer the identifiable harm of being unable to contract with the
many medical facilities that require Board certification.”138 The court
distinguished Phelps as involving a “speculative assertion” that “contrasts
sharply with the Morrison allegations that . . . many medical facilities and
private patients make Board certification a prerequisite to employment.”139
Citing Daniels, the Board countered that it did not have the same ability as
the unions job referral service that was described as a necessary
intermediary. Instead, the Board argued that it is an “unrelated third party
whose interference with the contract bears an attenuated or haphazard
connection to contracting between Morrison and future employers.”140 The
court dismissed that argument and emphasized that, for the purposes of rule
12(b)(6), Morrison’s allegations were sufficiently specific at the current
stage of litigation.141
In Shirkey v. Eastwind Community Development Corp.,142 a church
affiliated nonprofit organization denied Shirkey, a white minister, the
position of community developer. He challenged his non-hiring under
Section 1981 against three defendants, the National Division of the General
Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church (“National”),
the Baltimore-Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church
(“Conference”), and the Eastwind Community Development Corporation
(“Eastwind”).143 During his time as a minister, Shirkey’s community
development work helped create Eastwind, a non-profit corporation whose
goal was to promote economic development and quality of life in East
Baltimore. The community served by that project was predominately
African-American.144 Fifty percent of Eastwind's Board of Directors were
members of the Methodist church, while the other fifty percent were
residents of the surrounding community.145 After Eastwind's founding in
1990, it sought funding for a community developer position from National
through a program known as the “Community Developer's Program.”146
Eastwind received funding by completing a written application for the
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project, having it approved by the Conference, and finally submitting it to
National's office of community developers. In April of 1991, Shirkey
approached a board member of Eastwind and expressed interest in applying
for the position of community developer. The board member told Shirkey
that he could not apply for the position of community developer because
National required the position to be filled by an African-American as a
condition for their funding. As a result, Shirkey was not considered for the
position, and Eastwind ultimately hired an African-American. In response,
Shirkey brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that he was
denied the opportunity to apply for the community development position
with Eastwind due to racially restrictive criteria developed by National,
approved by the Conference, and implemented by Eastwind.147
National argued that it is not an appropriate defendant under Section
1981 because Shirkey and National did not share an employer/employee
relationship.148 Citing Daniels and Vakharia, the court rejected this
argument and emphasized that Section 1981 has been applied where there
is no direct employer/employee relationship.149 The court noted that as long
as the discriminating entity interfered with the plaintiff's ability to enter
into an employment contract on the basis of race, an employer/employee
relationship was not required.150 While Eastwind and National were
different corporate entities, the policy at issue in this case was directly
attributed to National; therefore, the court concluded that National's
liability was not predicated on any employer/employee relationship but,
rather, hinged on whether or not National intentionally impeded Shirkey's
ability to apply for the community developer position.151 Based on the
evidence, the court held that National could not credibly claim an
attenuated relationship between Eastwind's implementation of the
community developers program and National’s policies.152
In Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co.,153 the plaintiff Orlando Harris, an African
American man, owned “SPI,” a business that repaired smoke, fire, and
water damage to property in Oklahoma City. Defendant, Allstate, was an
insurer who had a program for referring its insured to approved vendors for
repair services.154 When one of Allstate's insured’s needed an emergency
repair service, Allstate would allow the insured to choose from a list of
vendors who provided that service. According to SPI, the insured rarely
had a preference. In that circumstance, Allstate would choose the vendor.155
SPI was on Allstate’s list, but allegedly received a disproportionately low
147
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number of the referrals.156 Harris alleged, inter alia, that Allstate violated
Section 1981 when it failed to administer its referral program free of racial
bias and that Allstate's discriminatory refusal to give referrals to SPI
precluded SPI from forming contracts with Allstate’s insured.157
The Tenth Circuit compared the decisions in Phelps, Daniels,
Vakharia, Morrison, and Shirkey to the facts present in this case.158 The
court noted that in Daniels, the union's job referral service was described as
the “necessary intermediary and conduit connecting job opportunities to job
referrals.”159 In this case, however, SPI presented no evidence that
placement on AllState’s list was a necessary requirement for SPI to enter
into contracts with Allstate's customers. As such, the court found that
Daniels, Morrison, and Vakharia were distinguishable because, unlike
Allstate, the defendants in those cases were actually in a position to
interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to make third party contracts.160 The
court articulated that relief is available under Section 1981 when a plaintiff
demonstrates that the interfering party discriminatorily uses its authority to
preclude the business from securing a contract with a third party and that it
“both possessed sufficient authority to significantly interfere with the
individual's ability to obtain contracts with third parties, and that the party
actually exercised that authority to the individuals detriment.”161 The court
held that the plaintiff's claim did not meet either of those requirements
because the complaint alleged that he did not receive the benefit of insurer's
referrals (as opposed to the insurer exercising its authority to the plaintiff's
detriment).162 Additionally, the court held that the defendant did not
possess sufficient authority to significantly interfere with the plaintiff's
ability to obtain contracts with third parties because being on the referral
list was not a necessary requirement for the plaintiff to enter into contracts
with Allstate's insured.163
In Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance,164 the plaintiff was an African American
business-woman who owned a restaurant called Lolas. For nineteen years,
Lolas operated out of one location in Manhattan; however, in 2008, it lost
its lease and attempted to move to Soho.165 Subsequently, the plaintiff
picked out a location in Soho, signed a lease, and applied for a liquor
license. Shortly thereafter, twenty-two community groups, including the
156
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defendants, challenged Lolas’ application to serve liquor.166 After
reviewing the evidence presented in opposition to the application, including
unanimous opposition by public officials (community board members and a
state senator, assemblyperson and councilmember), the testimony of a
traffic expert, and photos of traffic jams along Watts Street (the street
where Lola’s would operate), the board in charge of approving the license
denied Lola’s application.167 Plaintiff alleged that defendants
discriminatorily interfered with their right to contract with future customers
when they challenged Lolas’ license application.168 Under the Harris
framework, the court held that the defendants did not interfere with the
plaintiff's right to contract under Section 1981 because the defendants did
not have the power make the decisions that would interfere with the
plaintiff's ability to contract (only a court of law could have that power).169
Additionally, the court emphasized that a party must allege and identify
particular and specific business opportunities that were lost due to
discriminatory interference by a third-party before a claim for third-party
interference can be brought.170 Accordingly, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim because the plaintiffs failed to identify any
specific contracts that the defendant's alleged interference prevented them
from entering.171
IV. ANALYSIS
The Kia and Painters Union’s decisions suggest that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
can be applied to a broad spectrum of union behavior. While the plaintiff
did not succeed in either case, both decisions indicate that minority owned
businesses have relief when labor unions apply contractual provisions of
collective bargaining agreements or union policies in a discriminatory
manner. In Painters Union, the court ruled in favor of the defendant union
because (1) the union had a legitimate reason to audit the plaintiff’s books
(it received employee complaints), and (2) it did not receive employee
complaints from similarly situated white owned businesses.172 Similarly, in
Kia, the court held that the union’s conduct (such as the ordering of audits)
toward minority owned businesses were entirely consistent with lawful
actions by the union to collect unpaid CBA payments.173 In both cases, the
minority business owner failed because of insufficient evidence. The
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implication is that with sufficient evidence, a minority owned business
would have a viable claim under Section 1981 against a labor union.
Accordingly, if the union in Painters Union had not received employee
complaints and still audited the minority owned business, or if the union
received employee complaints from white owned businesses and did not
proceed with an audit, the plaintiff would have had a much greater chance
at success. Similarly, if the minority business owner in Kia had alleged that
the union was treating white owned businesses differently, the result may
have been more favorable to the plaintiff.
Returning to the hypothetical presented in the background section of
the Article (a union discriminatorily refusing to supply a letter of good
standing to a shipping company because its owner is African American),174
the owner would succeed on his claim if he brought evidence that: 1) the
union did not have a legitimate reason to deny him the letter, and 2) other
similarly situated white owned businesses received letters. Alternatively,
the minority business owner would likely succeed on his claim if he
brought evidence that: 1) the union did have a legitimate reason to deny
him the letter, or 2) they did not enforce the policy behind the denial
against similarly situated white owned businesses. The framework of this
analysis in practice would be similar to the test articulated by the Seventh
Circuit in Elkhatib.175
While Elkhatib involved a franchise agreement and not a collective
bargaining agreement, the case is still instructive for several significant
reasons. Indeed, the facts are analogous because the minority-business
owner of the Dunkin Donuts franchise would replace the hypothetical
shipping company owner in the analysis. Likewise, corporate Dunkin
Donuts replaces the union in the analysis because it discriminatorily
applied the terms of a standard (franchise) agreement to a minority-owned
business when it terminated the company’s agreement because the owner
refused to carry pork products. In addition to being factually analogous, the
case was significant because it was decided at the summary judgment
phase, rather than on a motion to dismiss.176 In Elkhatib, unlike in Kia and
Painters Union, the plaintiff produced evidence that Dunkin Donuts
allowed similarly situated white-owned franchises to carry less than the full
breakfast line. Accordingly, the Elkhatib court found that there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to find pretext.
Under the Elkhatib framework, the hypothetical shipping-company
owner would have to produce evidence that: (1) he belonged to a protected
class; (2) he met the labor union’s legitimate expectations with regard to
174
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the collective bargaining agreement; (3) he suffered an adverse action; and
(4) similarly-situated non-protected white business owners were treated
more favorably.177 Subsequent to such a showing, the traditional
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process would control.178
Unlike the cause of action for discriminatory application of contractual
provisions, plaintiffs have succeeded against unions under Section 1981 for
discriminatory interference with third party contracts. While Daniels
involved an individual member of a union and was decided early in the
evolution of this cause of action, nothing subsequent has been decided that
would prevent it from being used in the minority business owner-union
context.
Returning to the hypothetical shipping company owner, the Harris
framework would be applied in the following way: the hypothetical
plaintiff would have relief under Section 1981 if he demonstrated that the
union possessed 1) sufficient authority to significantly interfere with the
ability of his shipping company to obtain contracts with third parties and 2)
that the Union actually exercised that authority to the individuals detriment.
Similar to the psychiatrist in Valkharia who needed board certification to
practice psychiatry, if the owner of the trucking company showed that the
letter of good standing was a requirement to be hired by outside
contractors, he would meet the first prong of this framework. After meeting
that burden, like the plaintiff in Daniels and unlike the plaintiff in Ginx, the
owner of the trucking company would need to allege specific contracts that
were lost as a result of the interference by the union.
A review of the case history suggests that a minority owned business is
more likely to succeed on a claim that the contractual provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement are being applied in a discriminatory
manner than on a claim that a labor union’s conduct is discriminatorily
interfering with the minority owned business’ contracts. While the
individual plaintiff in Daniels succeeded on his claim, to date no case law
exists where a minority-owned business has brought a discriminatory
interference with contract claim against a union. Indeed, other than the
guidance provided by Daniels and the cases under different factual
circumstances, a minority business owner has sparse legal authority to
bring his or her claim under this cause of action. Conversely, a minority
business owner has stronger legal footing to bring a discriminatory
application of contractual provisions claim based on the decisions in Kia,
Painters Union and Elkahatib.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose and intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was to eradicate racial
discrimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Runyon made it clear that
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remedies should be available to private acts of discrimination. Allowing
unions to discriminate against minority owned business by applying the
terms of collective bargaining agreements in a discriminatory manner or by
interfering with a minority owned business’ ability to contract with third
parties is repugnant to the meaning and intent of Section 1981. Thus, these
two causes of action should provide relief to minority business owners who
find themselves being discriminated against by labor unions.

